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Abstract. The paper aims to providing an integrated theoretical framework for questioning the 
traditional understanding of the conditions under which geographical space favours knowledge 
creation and local dynamics of innovation and growth. The paper shows the analytical elements of 
the methodological shift in the economics of knowledge from an ex ante perspective that values 
static allocation problems, towards an ex post perspective that appreciates the actual conditions that 
support the production and diffusion of knowledge, one that values feedbacks, complementarities 
and interactions. The essential argument here is that systemic interactions and networking among 
innovators are necessary conditions for the success of knowledge creation, and that intentional 
action is required in order to benefit from knowledge flows. Within this perspective, knowledge is 
understood as a collective good where the coordination of the division of knowledge and of 
innovative activities has most relevant governance implications: interactions and networking plays a 
most important role here. Since, in fact, technological knowledge is fragmented into several 
portions of internal and external, tacit and codified competencies, which are commanded by 
different organisations, coordination between those organisations is most important to recombine 
the different and yet interdependent portions of knowledge, to integrate these and augment the 
internal competencies of firms. Knowledge interactions emerge as strategic processes in the 
production of new knowledge, and should be a central issue in a research agenda that value the 
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1. Introduction  
 
Traditional economic approaches view technological knowledge as either a pure public or pure 
private good and are focused on ex ante allocation problems, which derive from well-know market 
failures in achieving both private efficiency in the generation of knowledge and social welfare in 
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the diffusion of knowledge. These market failures are summarized in the most typical knowledge 
trade-off: when private incentives are strong enough to ensure the firm’s appropriation of the 
returns from investments in knowledge and innovation, social diffusion of knowledge and the 
related social welfare are harmed. Vice versa, when knowledge regimes encourage the socialization 
of innovation benefits, private incentives to innovate are low, and therefore underproduced, 
underutilized and unevenly distributed. Such approaches lead to the identification of specific and 
top-down institutions governing knowledge production and distribution. Public provision of 
knowledge, on the one hand, and intra muros R&D and innovation on the other have been seen as 
the most appropriate governance structures to overcome the problems of underinvestment in 
knowledge, together with intellectual property rights and the patenting systems. The latter, 
however, when too strong and rigid, enforce private incentives to innovate but can harm social 
diffusion, in turn pointing out another element of the classical knowledge trade-off (Patrucco, 
2008).    
 
Either technological knowledge is considered a pure public or a pure private good, in traditional 
perspectives knowledge is the result of linear and deductive processes that neglect important 
complementarities between public and private portions of knowledge, related feedbacks and the 
systemic and complex nature of the dynamics of knowledge generation and distribution. 
 
Recent achievements in the economics of innovation and knowledge questioned such standard 
views. Here, Schumpeterian perspectives on innovation that value interdependencies, technological 
complementarities and knowledge interactions, can successfully integrate and augment both the 
Arrovian approach to public knowledge and the market-for-knowledge approach. This integration 
can yield major benefits to the understanding of the characteristics, processes and governance of 
knowledge.  
 
First, such an integrated approach considers knowledge as the result of emergent and bottom-up 
processes, which are localized in the geographical and technological space. Second, such processes 
are characterized by systemic feedbacks and complementarities between different actors, both 
public and private, involved in the creation and distribution of knowledge. Such processes, and 
more precisely the effective role of interactions and the absorption of external knowledge by 
proactive firms, shape the attributes of knowledge itself. Technological knowledge is now 
understood as a collective good, the systemic outcome of cumulative and recombinatorial dynamics 
between public and private, internal and external knowledge, and in which interactions and learning 
among actors plays a key role. Third, the institutional, technological and geographical 
characteristics of innovation systems, in terms of variety and complementarity of actors, and 
connections among these, become new object for the implementation of appropriate knowledge 
governance mechanisms. In this perspective, the new economics of knowledge clearly shifts the 
focus from an ex ante towards an ex post perspective on the generation, circulation and governance 
of technological knowledge.  
 
The aim of this paper is to show the analytical elements of such a methodological shift from an ex 
ante perspective that values allocation problems, towards an ex post perspective that appreciates the 
actual conditions that support the generation and distribution of knowledge, together with the 
valorisation of feedbacks, complementarities and interactions. Technological knowledge and 
innovation systems are the emergent and collective outcomes of bottom-up processes that valorise 
the structural and dynamic characteristics of economic systems. Within this perspective, the 
dynamics of collective knowledge can be understood as a matter of knowledge coordination with 
most relevant governance implications, and within which knowledge interactions play a most 
important role. Since knowledge is fragmented into several portions of internal and external, tacit 
and codified competencies, which are owned by different organisations, coordination between those 
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organisations is most important to circulate, access and recombine the different and yet 
interdependent portions of knowledge. Knowledge interactions, defined in terms of the number and 
quality of connections and processes of interaction between the different knowledge owners, trigger 
the exchange and integration of complementary capabilities and therefore are seen as a specific 
mode of coordination of the division of knowledge. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
identifies the elements of the economics of technological knowledge and points to the idea of 
knowledge interactions as crucial mechanisms in the generation and distribution of knowledge in a 
collective approach. Section 3 enriches the framework with the integration of the problem of the 
coordination of the division of knowledge. It articulates the characteristics of the different forms of 
governance of knowledge and puts the complex system of interconnections among a variety of 
organisations that own fragmented, imperfect and yet complementary kinds of knowledge at the 
centre of the issue of knowledge coordination. Conclusions summarize and identify implications for 
innovation policy and knowledge governance.   
 
 
2. The basic elements of collective knowledge and the role of interactions 
 
2.1. Shifting approaches to the economics of knowledge: knowledge as a public, private and 
collective good 
Traditional economics of technological knowledge builds upon the recognition of important market 
failures in the generation and diffusion of knowledge. Considering either the classical Arrovian 
microeconomics of technological knowledge (Arrow, 1962a,b and 1969) or the application of the 
transaction costs approach developed by Ronald Coase (Coase, 1937 and 1960) and Oliver 
Williamson (1975, 1985 and 1996) to the economics of knowledge with the development of the 
notion of markets for knowledge (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001), pure markets generate 
allocation failures that undermine either private or public efficiency in the creation and distribution 
of technological knowledge. Clearly, standard economics of knowledge focuses on the ex ante 
perspective and allocation inefficiencies are the results of a well-known set of characteristics 
qualifying knowledge as an economic good.  
 
According to Kenneth Arrow, knowledge is non-appropriable, non-excludable, non tradable and 
non-divisible. Moreover, knowledge is the outcome of a deductive and linear process that utilizes 
scientific discoveries and developments in pure research and applies these into the specific activities 
of the firm. Such characteristics lead to market failures in the generation of knowledge that are due 
to the trade-off between the social benefits of a public diffusion of knowledge and the gains 
stemming from the private appropriation of inventive efforts. Imitation, free riding and opportunism 
could undermine the latter when the diffusion of knowledge is public.  
 
On the other hand, the elaboration upon the Coasian approach to the analysis of the costs of using 
the market puts emphasis on the fact that high levels of transaction costs in the market exchange are 
also due to the need of controlling the behaviours of eventual free riders and opportunists, when 
technological knowledge has the characteristics of the Arrovian public good. If we apply the 
transaction costs approach to the economics of technological knowledge, the failure of market 
allocation in supporting efficient knowledge production and diffusion can explain vertical 
integration strategies in the firm and in-house creation of new knowledge, which now can be seen 
as the main processes underlining the generation and accumulation of technological knowledge 
(Williamson, 1975, 1985 and 1996; Langlois, 1992). Specific markets for knowledge (Arora, 
Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001; Guilhon, 2001), based on intellectual property rights and the 
development of appropriation strategies centred upon patents, are implemented in order to try and 




In the Arrovian case, technological knowledge is understood as a public good. Public provision and 
diffusion of knowledge, especially via the academic system and public infrastructures, is seen as the 
only viable governance mechanism overcoming the knowledge trade-off, while intellectual property 
rights can increase appropriability but reduce the scope for social diffusion. Strong cumulability 
between different waves and stocks of knowledge is one of the most important effects that such 
public character bears on the generation of new technological knowledge. In the markets-for-
knowledge perspective, instead, intra muros innovative activity, enforced by IPRs, can lead to 
private efficiency in the generation of technological knowledge, which can be thought of as a pure 
private good characterized by full appropriablity, excludability, divisibility and tradability but very 
low (external) cumulative effects. Cumulability of knowledge is possible within the boundaries of 
the firm, but is more and more difficult with portions of knowledge that have been produced outside 
the firm. IPRs regimes and the patenting system arguably play a most important role in enforcing 
the governance of such characteristics and in stimulating in-house knowledge production processes.    
 
Such standard approaches has been challenged by the integration of the achievements in different 
fields of economic analysis, such as industrial economics, economics of organization, economics of 
learning, regional economics and the economics of science and university, into the broader field of 
the economics of innovation (Antonelli, 1995; Feldman, 1994; Geuna, 1999; Loasby, 1999; 
Malerba, 2002). The characteristics, processes and governance of technological knowledge can be 
put into a new light and understood from a different perspective, which critically and originally 
implements the traditional economics of technological knowledge. 
 
In this new approach, knowledge is an emergent, bottom-up and systemic phenomenon. Knowledge 
is fed by strong feedbacks and non-linearity between the public and the private sectors, and between 
internal (to the firm) knowledge and knowledge sourced externally, which can in turn bear 
important increasing returns in the production of new knowledge. Learning takes place within and 
outside the firm. Interactions and exchange between firms’ tacit knowledge and external general 
knowledge play a major role in contributing the eventual process of knowledge creation and 
distribution. Therefore, technological knowledge is characterized by important complementarities 
and recombinatorial effects between scientific, general knowledge resembling the Arrovian public 
good, and private, tacit and appropriable knowledge. Moreover and consequently, technological 
knowledge is understood as a collective good that can be easily and yet imperfectly cumulable and 
tradable. 
 
Let us detail the specific elements and processes qualifying collective knowledge.  
 
The intrinsic indivisibility of technological knowledge, well-understood by the seminal work of 
Kenneth Arrow, can be specified into more precise notions: 1) cumulability, when indivisibility 
applies to the vertical complementarity between the accumulated stock of previous knowledge and 
the new flows of knowledge; 2) complexity, when indivisibility refers to the horizontal variety of 
portions of knowledge that are necessary and indispensable to generate a new portion of 
knowledge; 3) fungibility, that is complement to complexity and refers to the variety of uses and 
applications of a single bit of knowledge, which can be replicated with low (incremental and 
variable) costs (Antonelli, 2003 and 2005).  
 
Building upon the Nelson and Winter (1982) approach to tacit knowledge, which challenged the 
traditional notion of knowledge as a pure public good, knowledge is now characterized also by high 
levels of appropriability. Knowledge is regarded as a quasi-private good, based upon tacit learning 
and it is embodied and localized in specific routines, human capital and artefacts. Therefore it is 
very idiosyncratic and characterized by high levels of intrinsic (but not complete) appropriability 
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and excludability. Moreover, knowledge is sticky, as a consequence of near-appropriability and the 
localized and embodied character.  
 
The notions of near-decomposability and modularity elaborated by Herbert Simon enrich the 
Nelson and Winter’s approach. The bundle of technological knowledge can be decomposed in 
modules, each of which is organized around links of complementarity to other modules. Ties of 
complementarity can be stronger or weaker according to the technological, industrial and 
institutional characteristics of the economic space in which each module is developed. Since 
technological knowledge is embodied in very specific human, organizational and technological 
structures, it can be appropriated, decomposed, replicated and recomposed more easily and at a 
faster pace only within modules that are located in proximate economic spaces (Brusoni and 
Prencipe, 2001; Langlois, 2002; Simon, 1981).      
 
Furthermore, knowledge can be tacit, codified and articulable. According to the prevailing 
characteristics of knowledge in terms of tacitness, codification and articulability, an array of 
different interaction modes and contexts can be more or less appropriate in favouring access, 
diffusion and the transformation of pre-existing modules of knowledge into new ones (Ancori, 
Bureth and Cohendet, 2000). When the industrial and technological features of knowledge and the 
set of norms and rules which determinate the development and introduction of a new given portion 
of knowledge are not expressed and formalized in specific ‘book of instructions’, namely a 
codebook, knowledge is tacit. In this case the pertinent knowledge base is not public and relying on 
a pure scientific base, but is much more the result of the implicit accumulation of experience, 
routines and learning by doing. Because such knowledge base is mainly personal, even when it is 
shared within a community, vis-à-vis interactions, master-apprentice-like relations and learning on 
the task are the typical modes of access and accumulation of that knowledge (Polanyi, 1958 and 
1966).     
 
At the opposite, when technological knowledge relies upon scientific knowledge, a specific 
codebook defining the characteristics of a given module of knowledge and the relevant 
development procedures exists. The members of the scientific and technological community 
systematically and explicitly refer to that codebook when accessing and integrating that knowledge. 
In this case, knowledge is codified and public to a great extent. Acquisition and distribution occur 
mostly by means of ‘blueprints’.  
 
In between tacit and codified knowledge, articulable knowledge presupposes some degree of 
codification when considering the base of knowledge measures depending upon. Nevertheless, the 
codebook that establishes the definitions of such knowledge and the procedures for its access and 
implementation into a new portion of knowledge or a new innovation is not manifest even to the 
members of the community which finally employs and develops knowledge itself. Even though an 
explicit book of definitions and instructions exists, it is not explicitly consulted and the contents of 
the codebook have been so fully internalised and appropriated within the community that they 
operate as implicit sources of technical knowledge and procedural rules. Articulation being social 
interaction, the degree to which articulable knowledge is public or private, and hence the extent to 
which it is shared within the community, depend on the costs of access, transmission and absorption 
of the relevant technical specifications and implementation procedures (Cowan, David and Foray, 
2000). 
 
The specification into articulability, tacitness and codification is most important in the 
understanding of collective knowledge in that it focuses on the communication codes, protocols and 
more generally on the system of interactions lying behind a given knowledge base. In turn, the 
context and processes of interactions are shaped by the extent to which actors are proximate, not 
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only from a geographical and technological viewpoint. The notion of proximity can be enriched and 
it can now be defined in terms of a number of dimensions: geographical, technological, social, 
cognitive and organizational. 
 
2.2. From knowledge spillovers to knowledge interactions 
The understanding of the elements of the economics of knowledge interactions benefit and is 
qualified when considering three strands in the literature on innovation.  
 
First, different kinds of externalities are said to contribute local accumulation of technological 
knowledge, which have been identified in an extensive body of empirical literature following the 
seminal contribution of Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer (1992). The MAR (Marshall-
Arrow-Romer) externalities tradition argues that geographical concentration and specialization in a 
single industry, coupled with local specialization strategies, foster technical externalities to be 
generated, transmitted and accumulated by local firms. The emergence and growth of a local body 
of technological knowledge is the result of intra-industry and geographically well-defined flows of 
technical know-how. Secondly, the so-called Jacobs externalities tradition (Jacobs, 1969) 
alternatively gives prominence both to inter-industrial knowledge transfer among geographically 
proximate but technologically different industries, and to local economic differentiation in contrast 
with specialization. Moreover, Jacobs stresses the role of cities and metropolitan areas as especially 
conducive for the effective exploitation of inter-industrial technical externalities and hence for the 
growth of local clusters of technological knowledge. Integrating the two approaches, Porter (1990) 
insisted on geographical specialization as a factor stimulating the effective diffusion of 
technological externalities, hence the MAR externalities argument. However, the role of internal 
competition and hence of economic differentiation is seen as crucial in the growth of local 
technological clusters, that is the Jacobs externalities argument. Technological knowledge is now 
localized because of the local competitive interactions between firms in the same technical space. In 
this context, Porter emphasizes the role of large firms as key actors in the local clustering of 
technological knowledge and innovation dynamics.  
 
Much empirical evidence gathered in the geography of innovation elaborated on the idea that 
agglomeration and therefore geographical proximity per se facilitate the transmission of knowledge 
and that localized externalities are a major driver of technological progress and economic growth 
(Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson, 1993; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999; Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996; Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser, 2002).  
 
This strand of literature clearly builds upon the Arrovian analysis of knowledge subsequently 
developed in the methodology by Griliches (1979 and 1992) and Jaffe (1986) with the well-known 
idea of a technology production function2. In these studies knowledge is seen as a public good, and 
knowledge externalities are a direct consequence of well-known characteristics of technological 
knowledge: non-divisibility, non-appropriability, non-rivalry in use, non-excludability. Knowledge 
externalities augment and supplement as a further input the production of other goods by means of 
capital and labour (Antonelli, 2014).   
 
Within well-defined geographical and technological spaces, knowledge and ideas are inputs that 
spill free across firms. The accumulation of labour, capital and R&D is the unique requirement for 
knowledge spillovers to take place and to exert positive and unconditional effects on output and 
productivity growth. Firms co-located in the geographical and technological space are able to take 
advantage from knowledge spillovers without occurring in any learning or transaction costs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 New growth theory models (Romer, 1986 and 1990) were also implemented along the line of analysis with generic 
and specific knowledge being as a matter of fact supplementary to each other. Also in new growth theory, learning 
occurs without costs and without the need of purposive and intentional effort to benefit from knowledge externalities.  
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However, such empirical evidence is far from being uncontroversial, both with regard to whether 
agglomeration favours knowledge externalities and with regard to the conditions under which 
geographical proximity facilitates the distribution of knowledge and the exploitation of external 
knowledge by co-localized firms (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Thompson and Fox Kean, 2005; 
Boschma and Weterings, 2005). More specifically, recent contributions qualified the relation 
between proximity, externalities and innovation, questioning the idea that this relation is always 
positive, independently of the presence of specific conditions. Agglomeration can yield both 
positive and negative consequences in terms of knowledge externalities. Most importantly and 
contrary to the received treatment of knowledge spillovers, the exploitation of externalities by co-
located firms is not the necessary and automatic consequence of geographical proximity and 
“industrial atmosphere”. On the contrary, firms willing to benefit from knowledge externalities 
need to commit resources for undertaking intentional activities of learning, interaction and 
cooperation that bear specific costs (Boschma and Iammarino, 2009; Antonelli, Patrucco and 
Quatraro, 2010; D’Este, Guy and Iammarino, 2012). A deeper understanding of the dynamics 
underlying the working of knowledge externalities is needed in order to identify the characteristics 
and sources of regional innovation systems. Such contributions make the point that the production 
and accumulation of technological knowledge is the result of peculiar, constrained and yet complex 
interdependences between technical and geographical factors such as labour mobility, feedbacks 
through formal and informal networks, technology agreements, University-industry linkages, and 
sub-contracting.  
 
Therefore, the second and key element the economics of collective knowledge is building upon is 
the appreciation of the importance of external knowledge and the related learning efforts firms need 
to put in place in order to benefit from knowledge sourced externally. External knowledge can be 
considered as an essential and non-disposable input as much as internal learning and R&D 
activities. Such inputs cannot be considered as substitute, or merely supplementary to each other as 
in the Griliches’ technology production function but they must be considered as strictly 
complementary for knowledge to be generated. Increasing returns in the production of knowledge 
can take place only when both internal and external knowledge are available and integrated into the 
firm’s production process. Both internal and external knowledge are equally necessary and 
indispensable for the generation of new knowledge (Weitzman, 1996 and 1998; Patrucco, 2008; 
Antonelli, 2014).   
 
Agglomeration per se is not sufficient anymore to give rise to knowledge transfer and to engender 
the benefits associated to knowledge externalities. The specificity of conditions characterizing 
particular places and times have a powerful effect on the production and circulation of 
technological knowledge, and therefore diverse geographical spaces affect in different ways the 
dynamics of technological knowledge over time (Gertler, 1995).  
 
The benefits stemming from knowledge externalities can be geographically bounded provided that 
co-location makes available an array of conducive circumstances for firms to share their 
knowledge, circulate their routines, establish innovation partnerships and integrate knowledge 
acquired from external sources with their own knowledge base. In this context, the role of 
interactions and of the embeddedness of the firm within geographical networks has been stressed. In 
other words, it has been highlighted that it is not mere co-location that favours knowledge to spill 
over and benefits proximate firms. It is instead the involvement of firms within selective and 
complex networks that makes localized learning possible and knowledge externalities available for 
co-located firms (Patrucco, 2005; Malmberg and Maskell, 2006; Giuliani, 2007) because of 
different kind of proximity that vary from geographical to institutional (Graf, 2011), from social 
(Breschi and Lissoni, 2009) to cognitive (Noteboom et alii, 2007).  
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The major achievement of this field of analysis is the recognition that only firms able to establish 
interconnections with a variety of knowledge producers can take advantage from the 
complementarity between their internal knowledge base and external resources. Elaborating further 
upon the research path opened by Cohen and Levinthal (1989 and 1990), different contributions 
confirm that firms purposefully establish interactions within networks precisely to access 
knowledge inputs sourced externally (e.g., Zahra and George, 2002; Roper, Du and Love, 2008; 
Love and Roper, 2009). Such literature shows that a net of knowledge transactions has 
progressively paralleled the generation of innovation and knowledge by means of vertically 
integrated R&D activities because a single firm is not able to invest the sufficient amount of 
resources to develop new knowledge through a fully internal process. The use of external 
knowledge inputs may yield clear advantages in overcoming the technological and financial 
limitations of in-house innovation, and may enlarge technological opportunities through the search 
of the external environment. At the same time, some internal technological competencies are 
necessary to explore for the more appropriate external knowledge available, as well as to enable an 
efficient absorption and use of the knowledge sourced externally. 
 
The diffusion of external knowledge is now a key determinant in the generation of new knowledge 
and innovation. Technological knowledge and the eventual introduction of innovation are now 
understood as the results of a cumulative process of distribution and recombination of different, pre-
existing bits of knowledge embodied in a variety of actors.    
 
An array of problematic consequences arises from such collective character of knowledge and 
highlights the key role assumed by interactions in the process of knowledge creation and 
distribution. Knowledge interactions are therefore the third essential element that needs to be 
appreciated to understand the economics of collective knowledge.  
 
Access to existing external knowledge is the necessary condition improving the effectiveness and 
rate of knowledge generation, enabling the acquisition and accumulation of knowledge already 
stored but dispersed in a number of different but yet complementary users. However, since 
knowledge is industry- and region-specific and ultimately individual, it is also very idiosyncratic 
and costly to be used elsewhere, i.e. in other regions, other industries and also other firms and 
individuals. A growing body of both empirical and theoretical literature shows that the gains from 
knowledge externalities by both users and imitators are not free. Knowledge does not spill over 
spontaneously. Its identification, access and exploitation by third parties require some dedicated 
resources and an array of costs is typically relevant: imitation costs (Mansfield, Schwartz and 
Wagner, 1981), absorption costs (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen, 
2003), networking costs (Agrawal, Cockburn and McHale, 2006; Beugelsdijk, 2007), cognitive 
costs (Nooteboom et alii, 2007), relational costs (Glaeser and Scheinkman, 2000), congestion costs 
(Boschma, 2005; Frenken, Van Oort, Verburg, 2007). The acquisition of external knowledge 
requires therefore qualified interactions with other agents. The exploitation of knowledge 
externalities implies the commitment of resources that are necessary to searching, screening, 
understanding, absorbing, purchasing and acquiring knowledge generated by other firms. The 
capability of agents to access external knowledge depends on the network of relations and common 
codes of interactions.   
 
These features bear important implications for the tradability, and more generally the diffusion of 
knowledge, especially when considering the contribution of the transaction costs approach. The 
notion of markets for knowledge is most important here (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2001; 
Guilhon, 2001). In fact, technological knowledge is quasi-tradable and it can be exchanged in both 
embodied forms (for instance, via labour mobility, and technologies and products flows) and 
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disembodied forms, through the markets for knowledge implemented upon knowledge-intensive 
business services (KIBS), patents and licenses. The more embodied is knowledge and the more it is 
only nearly-tradable, that is circulated within co-localized modules and between actors 
complementary from a technological viewpoint (Timmermans and Boschma, 2014). The more 
disembodied and general is knowledge and the more efficient are market institutions, the lower are 
transaction costs and the more effective are intellectual property rights in enforcing both 
appropriability and tradability. Here, knowledge transactions based on contracts effectively 
complements knowledge interactions. 
 
Consequently, conditions for the access and exploitation of knowledge sourced externally are 
harmed by 1) communication costs, that is, the costs agents must face to access, i.e. to search, store 
and decode the relevant bits of idiosyncratic knowledge owned by different and complementary 
actors; and 2) the trade-off between internal knowledge production costs and external knowledge 
access costs. Internal knowledge production costs can be defined as the costs necessary to put in 
place internal learning and R&D efforts, while access costs can be specified into interaction costs 
and transaction costs, and defined as the costs necessary to implement connections and learning 
between the firm and the system in which it is embedded, in order to access external portions of 
knowledge. 
 
In other words, knowledge interactions arises as a fruitful research field in the economics of 
innovation in that actors must face specific costs to access and internalise portions of external 
knowledge, which can be very different from those already accumulated and used internally, but 
which are strictly complementary to internal R&D and learning, and indispensable for the working 
of the entire process of knowledge generation. Knowledge interactions emerge as a key element in 
the systemic approach to innovation together with the complementarity of external knowledge, and 
in contrast to traditional views on innovation and knowledge (Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1. Contrasted views on external knowledge and learning  
Essential features  
 
Economic approaches 
External knowledge  Interactions and learning  
 




- Knowledge externalities 
augment capital and labour  
 
- Automatic effects of 
technological and geographical 
proximity 
 
- No learning, interaction or 
transactions costs to benefit 
from external knowledge 
 
- Free activities 
 
Knowledge as a collective  
good  
 
- Complementary to internal 
R&D and learning  
 
- Non disposable for the 
working of knowledge 
generation 
- Purposive and intentional 
efforts to benefit from external 
knowledge 
 




Communication opportunities and recombinatorial learning are at the base of the integration and 
recombination of existing complementary kinds of knowledge, most of which are external to the 
firm. They benefit from agglomeration economies, technological complementarities, social and 
institutional proximity. The number and quality of connections characterizing innovation systems 
and their capacity to carry complementary flows of knowledge play a major role in internalising 
knowledge spillovers within the system, exploiting external knowledge and knowledge 
interdependencies, in turn building the conditions under which collective learning can take place 
and knowledge can be both generated and distributed efficiently.      
 
The processes by means of which each element, internal and external, scientific and tacit, of 
technological knowledge is generated and distributed affect such characteristics and reveal a variety 
of interaction mechanisms that are specific to each type of knowledge (Antonelli, 1999): 1) 
recombination matters to access external general knowledge and to integrate it into the specific 
productive activity of the firm. Here, intellectual property right regimes and university-industry 
linkages exert a key role; 2) socialization enhances the diffusion of external tacit knowledge by 
means of labour mobility and informal interactions between workers as well as between scientists. 
Such informal interactions are supported by the social characteristics, defined in terms of trust and 
the reciprocity of knowledge exchange, of the environment in which actors play; 3) learning allows 
internal tacit knowledge to be accumulated, embodied in and transmitted through firms’ routines, 
organizational structures and human capital. The dynamics of investments in human capital and 
machines play a most important role here; 4) finally, R&D activity in firms, universities and public 
laboratories, supports the generation of internal and external general knowledge that can be 
appropriated by means of IPRs and knowledge transactions. Firm’s and university’s patenting and 
licensing activities favour the tradability of such private general knowledge in the markets for 
knowledge.  
 
Each of these processes is necessary for the dynamics of collective knowledge to fully take place. 
Technological knowledge is now viewed as a process of interpolating relationships among 1) firm-
based learning and accumulation of internal tacit knowledge, 2) intra-muros R&D activities which 
favour codified knowledge to be gathered, 3) access to external tacit know-how and competence, 4) 
accumulation and recombination of existing external codified knowledge.              
 
Within this perspective, the analysis of the interaction between internal knowledge production 
costs, and external transaction and interaction costs that are necessary to access external modules of 
knowledge, can be the base for the understanding of the problem of coordination of the division of 
knowledge within the approach to collective technological knowledge (Patrucco, 2009). The trade-
off between internal knowledge production costs and external access costs moreover can contribute 
the understanding of the bundle of coordination within innovation systems and paves the way for 
the analysis of knowledge interactions as a mechanisms for the governance of collective 
technological knowledge.  
 
In this perspective, innovation systems emerge as the complex result of the different processes of 




3. The division of knowledge, interactions and the governance of innovation  
 
Economics of innovation has been recently expanding as a fertile domain to apply the analysis of 
the changes occurring in the structure of interactions between organizations, their characteristics 
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and their effects, as developed by complexity theory (Lane and Maxfield, 2005; Antonelli, 2005; 
Frenken, 2006).  
Integrating insights from complexity theory, economics of innovation and knowledge enriched with 
the analysis of the role of interactions and networks the understanding of learning as an intentional, 
mindful and purposive behavior put in place by myopic firms, that is one of the cores of the 
economics of innovation. Actors intentionally interact and learn in order to acquire and coordinate 
knowledge and competences sourced externally. These are complementary to those internally 
developed by each actor, since no single actor is able to command all the competences necessary to 
innovate in isolation. Firms are able to innovate when they can access and absorb competencies 
sourced externally, learned through interactions and recombined with the internal knowledge of the 
firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989 and 1990). Only when firms select and manage effectively 
external linkages, firms can exploit complementarities between internal knowledge and the 
capabilities provided by external organizations such as other firms, universities and R&D centers 
(Patrucco, 2008). 
The grafting of complexity theory into the body of economics of innovation (Antonelli, 2011) 
recently put into a new light Marshallian insights about the coordination of the division of 
knowledge (Richardson, 1972; Loasby, 2002). Along the lines paved by Friedrich von Hayek 
(1945) and Herbert Simon (1962), technological knowledge can be defined as a complex system of 
interconnections among a variety of organisations that own fragmented, imperfect and yet 
complementary kinds of knowledge. These basically involve technical know-how, organisational 
skills and competencies in understanding consumers’, users’, suppliers’ and markets’ behaviours, 
each of which in turn relies on a different combination of tacit capabilities and scientific knowledge 
sourced both internally and externally. Moreover, the way in which interconnections among the 
different actors of the system are implemented is main issue at stake in order to both exploit 
interdependencies (i.e., knowledge at the system level is not the mere addition of knowledge at the 
different micro levels) and make such exploitation efficient (i.e., reducing the cost of the 
interactions needed to increase knowledge at the system level).            
 
This points to the question of how economic agents and their organizations acquire and coordinate 
innovative capabilities and new knowledge. Following the seminal contribution of Keith Pavitt 
(1998), a rich stream of studies has highlighted that the division of labour has major implications 
for the organization of innovation (Brusoni and Prencipe 2001; Jacobides, 2006; Brusoni, Prencipe 
and Pavitt, 2011), 
 
Innovation systems clearly provide evidence for such division of labour between different 
producers of knowledge that perform different and yet complementary innovative activities, and 
stress the need of coordination and governing mechanisms. Here, for instance, larger firms often 
base their activity on formally trained competencies and focus their technological activity on R&D-
intensive processes, subcontracting the production of components and intermediary inputs to small 
firms that are characterised by tacit know-how and that are often specialised in very specific 
manufacturing processes. At the same time, large firms can cooperate and even contract pure 
research to the academic system. In such a situation, very often consultants provide knowledge-
intensive services in order to integrate, for instance, R&D-intensive competencies into the daily 
routines of small producers or the outcome of pure research into the activity of large firms. When 
the different portions of knowledge belonging to small and large firms, to consultants and to 
universities need to be integrated into each other in order to generate the eventual innovation we 
finally observe, coordination matters.   
 
The analysis of the organization of knowledge generation and diffusion in innovation systems is at 
the centre of an intense and rich debate between scholars arguing how complex environments are 
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better coordinated and managed. Three main organizational solutions have been characterized as 
appropriate for accessing and coordinating external knowledge in complex environments such as 
innovation systems: a) vertically integrated firms guided by managerial authority and command; b) 
horizontal networks based both on modular organizations that relies upon market transactions and 
outsourcing and on spontaneous interactions such as in the case of districts; c) directed and 
hierarchical networks between collaborative and complementary partners and centred upon key 
firms. Table 1 summarizes these differences both in terms of the coordination features of the 
different organizational solutions, and in terms of the implications for the innovation process. 
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3.1. From vertical integration of R&D to modular networks and markets for knowledge 
While the vertically integrated R&D model dominated nearly the entire XX century, taking 
advantage from scale and scope economies in R&D (Chandler, 1977; Penrose, 1959), its 
progressive demise and vanishing-out opened up a range of decentralized forms of organizing 
innovative and productive capabilities, based either on outsourcing and market transactions, or on 
collaborations (Langlois, 2004). 
The vertically integrated corporation and its R&D laboratories see their margins of autonomy and 
self-sufficiency shrink. In particular, large companies lose their prime position as the place par 
excellence for the production of innovation. In fact, in a complex environment, characterized by 
continuous changes in the features of the products and production technologies, by radical 
uncertainty and by ever more extreme scientific and technological specialization, the individual 
company has difficulty in managing, purely through the capacities produced internally, all the 
competencies needed for the process of the generation of new knowledge.  
The picture briefly summarized above thus questions not only the model of the integrated 
corporation, but also the traditional schemes of the organization of innovation. This implies that the 
linear and closed model must be replaced and firms must structure themselves so as to be able to 
draw advantage from the external knowledge available integrating it effectively with the knowledge 
produced internally (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke and West, 2006).  
As a consequence, consensus has grown in recent times amongst innovation scholars around the 
idea that, if firms are not able to develop independently a sufficient innovation capacity on their 
own, they can implement a variety of solutions that goes from one extreme (vertical integration), to 
another (the market), passing through a variety of hybrid strategies, forms of strategic alliances and 
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inter-organizational relations aimed at minimizing the costs of external co-ordination and the 
maximization of the creative contribution of the individual companies. This has opened the way to 
the analysis of the various forms of decentralization, specialization and division of innovation and 
production that emerged following the crisis of the vertically integrated corporation. 
The original view put forward by Herbert Simon (Simon, 1962 and 2002) has been the point of 
departure, especially in economics and management sciences, of the literature on modularity and 
market outsourcing. In recent years, this literature addresses the conditions under which modular 
and market-like organizational structures are preferred to integrated solutions (Sanchez and 
Mahoney, 1996; Arora, Gambardella and Rullani, 1998; Baldwin and Clark, 1997). When systems 
grow so extensively and the interconnections between the different elements and sub-systems 
become so numerous, their coordination under an integrated structure is almost unfeasible. Then 
modular organizations are preferred and they imply breaking up the system into almost independent 
sub-systems that interact each other on a weak base and through standardized interfaces. In Baldwin 
and Clark (1997) and Langlois (2002), for instance, these modular strategies and the organization of 
production and innovation as nearly decomposable systems are seen as appropriate solutions to 
manage complex and otherwise troublesome organizations and technologies.  
As claimed by this literature (e.g., Chesbrough and Teece, 1996), firms can switch from integrated 
organization of innovation to modular strategies according to the characteristics of the technologies 
and the knowledge they build upon in order to introduce novelty. The more systemic, 
interconnected and articulated are the knowledge bases and technologies necessary to innovate, the 
more efficient is the adoption of modular organization; on the contrary, the smaller is the number of 
elements that need to interact to generate an innovation, the easier is the coordination through 
vertical integration of R&D.  
3.2. Organizational innovations in the governance of knowledge: hierarchical networks and 
platforms 
The main critiques moved to this approach have highlighted two key points. First, complex systems 
and technologies are precisely such because it is not possible to decompose these into discrete 
chunks as modular strategies would assume. One of the key aspects of complexity relies in fact in 
the non-decomposability of the different elements and sub-systems. Firms are interdependent in 
both their structures and strategies because of the feedbacks loops that stems from their interactions, 
and changes in the characteristics and conduct of one firm determine transformations in 
interconnected organizations (Stacey, 1995). Second, firms do not necessarily swing between pure 
modular or pure integrated solutions when they are facing the choice of how organize their 
innovative activity. Instead, the features of the two opposite solutions coexist and firms are able to 
rely upon a variety of inter-organizational arrangements that may bring about advantages of both 
modularity and integration (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2001). Moreover, and consequently, in complex 
systems increasing heterogeneity of technological capabilities and interconnections implies that 
innovative firms need to command a wider and wider set of knowledge in order to be able to 
effectively organize inter-firms relations and absorb technological skills from external sources 
(Brusoni, Prencipe and Pavitt, 2001).    
In this regards, economics and management, as well as sociological literature progressively 
provides consensus that networks are a third way whose efficiency relies in the fact that they make 
learning and innovation possible by exploiting resource heterogeneity across embedded firms. 
Combining the flexibility of markets with the visible hand of organization, inter-firm ties reduce the 
costs of access to dispersed and diverse sources of knowledge, which is then considered the main 
driver of innovation and new knowledge generation (Powell, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Uzzi, 1997; Burt, 2000; Kogut, 2000; Ahuja, 2000; Smith-
Doerr and Powell, 2005).  
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Innovation studies in particular gathered consensus upon the idea that networks are loci of 
innovation because collaboration favors the access to a broad set of complementary technological 
competencies and becomes an opportunity to recombine existing resources held by individual firms 
into new knowledge. In particular, the structure of the network influences the chances firms have to 
innovate, and being embedded in well-developed and heterogeneous environments enhancing the 
likelihood firms have to learn from knowledge sourced externally (e.g., De Bresson and Amesse, 
1991; Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel, 2000; Zahra and George, 2002; Love and Roper, 2009; 
Ozman, 2009). 
The growth of clusters and districts (Breschi and Malerba, 2005) is for instance centered upon the 
implementation of horizontal networks where the provision of knowledge is the result of the 
increasing specialization and division of labor in the production of knowledge and where both 
formal and informal mechanisms allows trustworthy knowledge exchange and user-producer 
knowledge interactions. Well-defined geographical spaces provide the proper environment for the 
development of such networks where and when they concentrate not only specialized firms that 
interact within the supply chain or across different sectors, but also with knowledge-intensive 
business services, R&D labs and universities. 
The qualitative structure of the network and the role played by specific actors received a primary 
importance in this literature and different structures have been identified together with their relative 
advantages. In particular, two opposite configurations have been particularly successful in the 
literature: networks characterized by structures with strong and redundant ties have been contrasted 
to structures with weak, non-redundant ties and “structural holes” (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990).  
Following Granovetter’s (1973) argument about the “strength of weak ties”, Burt (1992 and 2000) 
in particular argues that networks with dense and strong ties are inefficient in accessing external 
knowledge both because they may yield a lack in the variety of resources needed to innovate, and 
because they also imply a redundant communication structure, with more connections than needed 
and higher communication costs. Hierarchical structures characterized by non-redundant ties are 
instead more appropriate to organize innovation because of the key role played by “structural 
holes”. “Structural holes” are key actors occupying a brokerage position between nodes. They 
arbitrate and flow knowledge between firms and groups of firms that are not tied each other and for 
this reason occupy a powerful and central position in the structure, which hence assumes a clear 
hierarchical configuration.  
Coleman (1990) and subsequently Uzzi (1997 and 1999) elaborated the opposite claim, arguing that 
redundant ties, and dense networks have a clear advantage when firms need to exchange and 
communicate complex knowledge. Redundant connections promote trust-based relations and lead 
easily to cooperative behaviors. This favors innovation as a collective action through repeated 
exchange of complementary information and knowledge among the different organization of the 
systems. This structure tends to be flatter and characterized by actors with overlapping 
competencies as well as power in the network.  
Evidence on which structure is likely to be more appropriate as innovation strategy in more general 
terms is mixed, and recently features of both dense and sparse networks have been proved to be 
positively correlated to firm performances (Rowley, Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000; Reagan and 
McEvily, 2003). 
On the one hand, the increasing division of labor brought about by complexity in both products and 
knowledge engenders an increase in the number of specific components and bodies knowledge that 
need to be recombined in the final product. Redundant connections are often necessary in order to 
complement different specialized skills and directly share the relevant knowledge among different 
firms in the systems. Direct collaboration, i.e. not mediated by a structural hole, between for 
 16	  
instance two specialized suppliers, can be for instance necessary to co-define and co-implement a 
new component or a sub-system of a complex product. In this case the network has some features of 
the dense and flat structure described by Coleman and Uzzi.  
On the other, however, increasing specialization requires the broadening of the knowledge base of 
system integrators as coordinating organizations in order both to understand innovations and 
knowledge sourced externally and to manage the network of outsourced components and sub-
systems of technologies and knowledge. Networks can be characterized by structural holes, 
arbitrating through a hierarchy the interactions between organizations that are not directly 
connected. System integrators for instance can be defined as specific type of structural holes at the 
center of a recombinatorial flow of different bodies of technological knowledge in complex 
innovations (Sturgeon, 2002; Prencipe, Davies and Hobday, 2003). The competence of a system 
integrator in this case involves the ability to govern the networked process by which innovations are 
collectively produced and shared (Kogut, 2000). In this regard, networks where system integrators 
play as central brokers do not suffer the weaknesses of pure modular strategies, where the system is 
conceived as easily decoupled in interdependent chunks. 
In particular, the idea of hierarchical networks is emerging in the literature on innovation and an 
array of this type of networks can be identified, stemming from technological alliances (Hagedoorn 
and Hesen, 2007), to coalitions for innovation (Gilson, Sabel and Scott, 2009), from network 
centred around system integrators (Prencipe, Davies and Hobday, 2003) to technology and 
innovation platforms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002; Gawer, 2009; Consoli and Patrucco, 2008; 
Patrucco, 2012). These are networks in which the interactions do not emerge and evolve 
spontaneously (like in traditional clusters and districts), but in which key players (e.g., platform 
leaders and system integrators) exercise a guiding role on the behavior of the other actors, selecting 
the members of the platform itself and directing the behavior and the evolution of the system as a 
whole. Moreover, the active search for knowledge complementarity and exploitation of variety 
(contrasted to mere agglomeration) between different activities characterizes these organizational 
solutions, which appear therefore to be structured and designed with a view to precise and pre-
determined innovation goals. Knowledge interactions in these types of networks are complemented 
by knowledge transactions (Antonelli and Patrucco, 2014) as means to coordinate the variety of 
knowledge-generating activities performed by the different members of the network and to 
effectively exploit knowledge complementarities. 
Hierarchical networks like platforms produce an outcome – an innovation – that is the result of 
collective learning and alignment of investments. In platform organizations, a variety of agents 
participate to the production and supply of products and services; each unit exists independently 
according to own goals and capacity but, at the same time, responds to a collective goal through 
shared communication rules. Hierarchical networks stress therefore the role of the complex 
structure of relations necessary to exploit, create and transmit technological capabilities. In this 
regard, a central component for the rationale underpinning platforms is maximising the variety of 
contributions stemming from a variegated knowledge base while maintaining coherence through a 
minimum level of hierarchy deployed by key firms as platform leaders. In this regard, platforms are 
purposefully open to entry of new actors and, thereby, of new competences: the extent of 
contribution by each additional unit depends endogenously on the relative value of internal 
competences measured against the collective goal.  
 
In this sense, hierarchical networks represent a new organizational innovation, increasingly 
significant also from an empirical viewpoint since they are more and more frequently applied to 
different industries. These types of networks are also new governance solutions for the coordination 
of knowledge generation and distribution, alternative to either vertical integration of R&D through 
large firms, or modular systems and markets for knowledge based on contracts and IPRs, or 
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spontaneous clusters and districts based on geographical agglomeration. The systemic generation 
and distribution of technological knowledge is now the result of a complex set of collaborative 
strategies between firms’ based learning and the absorption of external knowledge originated in 
both firms (e.g., suppliers, clients, rivals) and institutions (e.g., universities, R&D labs, TTOs). The 
presence of multiple, formal and informal, interactions, the active and intentional participation of 




4. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The approach to knowledge as a collective good appreciates complementarities among different 
kinds of knowledge and the need of special efforts at the micro and system level to put in place 
interactions, connections and viability conditions that make such complementary kinds of 
knowledge accessible. In this perspective, the generation of technological knowledge does not only 
impinge on firm-based R&D and learning by doing, but implies systemic interactions and external 
learning between firms (i.e., user-producer relations within the same sector, and inter-industrial 
relationships) and between these and non-manufacturing institutions (for instance, universities and 
knowledge intensive business services). The production of collective knowledge is thus 
characterized by interdependencies among different kinds of knowledge generated and accumulated 
in different specific contexts by a plurality of actors. The production of technological knowledge is 
therefore a systemic activity as a result of the interactions necessary to access and make 
complementary kinds of knowledge circulated. In turn, technological knowledge is the result of 
such interactions among actors characterized by industrial, technological, organizational and 
institutional specific features.          
 
Second, and consequently, the conditions for interactions and learning mechanisms play a major 
role in the dynamics of technological knowledge. Firms able to establish interconnections with a 
variety of actors can take advantage from and internalise complementarities between internal and 
external knowledge. Learning refers to both technologies and techniques that are already in place 
within the firm and to bundles of external embodied and disembodied knowledge. New amounts of 
knowledge and new technologies can be more easily introduced in those fields in which the firm 
has already accumulated competencies and know-how.  
 
Either when considering the case of private mechanisms for the creation and appropriation of 
knowledge or in the case of public provision through the academic and public research system, the 
related assumptions on the characteristics of technological knowledge, and consequently the related 
governance mechanisms, has been challenged by the collective approach to technological 
knowledge. In this approach knowledge is the result of interdependencies and feedbacks between 
different organisations that are both horizontally and vertically complementary. Different modes of 
coordination and governance arise from such interdependencies and feedbacks, and they cannot be 
defined but ex post as the result of the network of specific knowledge interactions implemented by 
the firms.  
 
Technological knowledge is therefore collective because it is the result of shared and intentional 
processes of knowledge interactions. A variety of knowledge owners and knowledge producers 
(such as, large and small manufacturing firms, University, business services, R&D centres and 
business associations) need to be willingly involved in such a collective process. In this respect, 
technological knowledge is an emergent property of a complex network of interactions that 
characterise innovation systems. Knowledge interactions are a crucial element in such emergent 
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dynamics in that they trigger the extent to which external knowledge can be circulated, accessed 
and eventually internalized at the system level.  
 
This has major implications for innovation systems. Innovation systems as well are emergent 
phenomena according to the capacity of innovative actors to distribute, access and recombine 
complementary portions of knowledge within a given economic space. In this context, firms are 
facing an increase in the complexity of the interactions and connections necessary to effectively 
exploit knowledge externalities and integrate knowledge sourced externally. Innovation systems 
able to coordinate such a complex net of interconnections among various actors will also 
successfully internalise knowledge externalities at the system level. Innovation systems can be 
based upon different combinations of knowledge interactions and knowledge transactions according 
to the kind of knowledge they are using and producing. Knowledge transactions can prevail when 
knowledge can be more easily appropriated and traded, in both embodied and disembodied forms, 
through patents and contracts, and innovation systems take the form of modular networks and 
markets for knowledge. At the opposite, innovation systems are centred around knowledge 
interactions when collaborations goes beyond arms’ length transactions and spot contracts but 
instead involved long term agreements, quasi-integration between users and producers, and 
processes of co-design, like in clusters and districts. In between, the implementation of 
organizational innovations developing articulated and hierarchical networks that combine both 
knowledge transactions and knowledge interactions is becoming an increasingly diffused mode of 
coordinating knowledge generation and distribution. In these types of networks, leading firms 
dynamically select the members of the systems with the dual aim of exploiting knowledge 
complementarities and preserving network cohesion and common goals.  
 
This analysis is relevant from the viewpoint of both the strategic management of innovation and the 
innovation policy. At the strategic level, both the active selection of the members of the network 
and their structured coordination should become a major goal for the management of innovation 
systems in that they enable to overcome the limits of the spontaneous coordination of innovative 
efforts within networks. Moreover, firms willing to assume a leading role within innovation 
systems should be able to combine at the same time: i) the scope of knowledge complementarities, 
avoiding redundancies of technological capabilities; and ii) the response to common goals, avoiding 
excessive dispersion of resources.  
 
From the innovation policy viewpoint, hierarchical networks such as platforms, open alliances and 
coalitions should be key elements of regional, national and transnational innovation systems. More 
specifically, the idea of building a European research and innovation area such as the one depicted 
in the agenda of Horizon 2020 emphasizes connections and relations as drivers for fostering 
innovative performances and growth at the European level. Innovation platforms, open alliances 
and coalitions should be considered as valued policy tools to implement such connections and 





Agrawal, A., Cockburn, I and McHale, J. (2006), Gone but not forgotten: Knowledge flows, labor 
mobility, and enduring social relationships, Journal of Economic Geography 6(5), 571-591.  
 
Ahuja, G. (2000), Collaboration networks, structural holes and innovation: A longitudinal study, 
Administratively Science Quarterly 45 (3), 317-343.  
 
 19	  
Ancori, B., Bureth, A. and Cohendet, P. (2000), The economics of knowledge: the debate about 
codification and tacit knowledge, Industrial and Corporate Change 9, 255-287.  
 
Antonelli, C. (1995), The Economics of Localized Technological Change and Industrial Dynamics, 
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
 
Antonelli, C. (1999), The Microdynamics of Technological Change, London: Routledge.  
 
Antonelli, C. (2003), Knowledge complementarity and fungeability: implications for regional 
strategies, Regional Studies 37 (6-7), 595 - 606.  
 
Antonelli, C. (2005), Models of knowledge and systems of governance, Journal of Institutional 
Economics 1, 51-73  
 
Antonelli, C. (ed.) (2011), Handbook on the Economic Complexity of Technological Change, 
Cheltenham,  Edward Elgar,  
 
Antonelli, C. (2014), Variety and dynamics of knowledge governance mechanisms, in Antonelli, C. 
and Link, A. (eds.), Handbook on the Economics of Knowledge, London, Routledge. 
 
Antonelli, C. and Patrucco, P.P. (2014), Organizational innovations, ICTs and knowledge 
governance: The case of platforms, in J. M. Bauer and M. Latzer (eds.), Handbook on the 
Economics of the Internet, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, forthcoming. 
 
Antonelli, C., Patrucco, P.P, Quatraro, F. (2011), Productivity growth and pecuniary knowledge 
externalities: An empirical analysis of agglomeration economies in European regions, Economic 
Geography 87 (1), 23-50. 
 
Arora, A., Fosfuri, A. and Gambardella, A. (2001), The Markets for Technology, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
Arora, A., Gambardella, A. and Rullani, E. (1998), Division of labour and the locus of inventive 
activity, Journal of Management and Governance 1 (1), 123-140. 
 
Arrow, K. J. (1962a), The economic implications of learning by doing, Review of Economic Studies 
29, 155-173. 
 
Arrow, K. J. (1962b), Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention, in Nelson, R. 
R. (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Arrow, K. J. (1969), Classificatory notes on the production and transmission of technical 
knowledge, American Economic Review 59, 29-35.  
 
Audretsch, D. B. and Feldman, M. (1996), Spillovers and the geography of innovation and 
production, American Economic Review, 86 (3), 630–640. 
 
Baldwin, C. Y. and Clark, K. B. (1997), Managing in the age of modularity, Harvard Business 
Review (September-October), 84-93. 
 
Beugelsdijk, S. (2007), The regional environment and a firm’s innovative performance: A plea for a 
multilevel interactionist approach, Economic Geography 83 (2), 181-199. 
 20	  
 
Boschma, R. (2005), Proximity and innovation: A critical assessment, Regional Studies 39 (1), 61-
74. 
 
Boschma R., Iammarino S. (2009), “Related variety, trade linkages and regional growth in Italy”, 
Economic Geography 85 (3), 289-311. 
 
Boschma, R. and Weterings, A. B. R. (2005), The effect of regional differences on the performance 
of software firms in the Netherlands, Journal of Economic Geography 5(5), 567-588 
 
Breschi, S. and Lissoni, F. (2001), Knowledge spillovers and local innovation systems: A critical 
survey, Industrial and Corporate Change 10, 975-1005. 
 
Breschi, S. and Lissoni, F. (2009), Mobility of skilled workers and co-invention networks: An 
anatomy of localized knowledge flows, Journal of Economic Geography 9(4), 439–468.  
 
Breschi, S. and Malerba, F. (eds) (2005), Clusters, networks and innovation, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Brusoni, S. and Prencipe, A. (2001), Unpacking the black box of modularity: technologies, products 
and organizations, Industrial and Corporate Change 10, 179-205. 
 
Brusoni, S., Prencipe, A. and Pavitt, K (2001), Knowledge specialisation and the boundaries of the 
firm: why do firms know more than they make?, Administrative Science Quarterly 46 (4): 597-621.  
 
Brusoni, S., Prencipe, A. and Pavitt, K. (2011), Knowledge Specialization, Organizational 
Coupling, and the Boundaries of the Firm: Why Do Firms Know More than They Make?, 
Administrative Science Quarterly December 46 (4), 597-621. 
 
Burt, R. (1992), Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.  
 
Burt, R. (2000), The network structure of social capital, in Sutton, S. I. and B. M. Staw (eds), 
Research in Organizational Behaviour, Greenwich CE: JAI Press.  
 
Chandler, A. D. (1962) Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Chesbrough H. W., Vanhaverbeke W. and West J. (eds) (2006), Open Innovation: Researching a 
New Paradigm, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Chesbrough, H. and Teece, D. (1996), When is virtual virtuous: Organizing for innovation, Harvard 
Business Review 74 (1), 65-74.  
 
Clark, G.L., Feldman, M. and Gertler, M.S. (eds.) (2001), The Oxford Handbook of Economic 
Geography, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Coase, R. (1937), The nature of the firm, Economica 4, 386-405. 
 
Coase, R. (1960), The problem of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics 3, 1-44. 
 
 21	  
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. (1990), Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and 
innovation, Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 128-152. 
 
Cohen, W.M., Levinthal, D.A. (1989), Innovation and learning: The two faces of R&D, Economic 
Journal 99, 569-596. 
 
Coleman, J. (1990), The Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Consoli, D. and Patrucco, P. P. (2008), Innovation platforms and the governance of knowledge: 
evidence from Italy and the UK, Economics of Innovation and New Technology 17 (7), 701-718. 
 
Cowan, R., David, P. A. and Foray, D. (2000), The explicit economics of knowledge codification 
and tacitness, Industrial and Corporate Change 9 (2), 211-253.   
 
D'Este, P., Guy, F., Iammarino, S. (2013) Shaping the formation of university-industry research 
collaborations: what type of proximity does really matter? Journal of Economic Geography 13 (4), 
537-558. 
 
De Bresson, C. and Amesse, F. (1991), Networks of innovators: A review, Research Policy 20 (5), 
363-379.  
 
Dumais, G., Ellison, G. and Glaeser, E. L. (2002), Geographic concentration as a dynamic process, 
Review of Economics and Statistics 84, 193-204. 
 
Feldman, M. and Massard, N. (eds.) (2002). Institutions and Systems in the Geography of 
Innovation. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Feldman, M. P. (1994), The Geography of Innovation, Boston: Kluwer Academic Press. 
 
Frenken, K. (2006), Technological innovation and complexity theory, Economics of Innovation and 
New Technology 15 (2), 137-155. 
 
Frenken, K., Van Oort, F., Verburg, T. (2007), Related variety, unrelated variety and regional 
economic growth, Regional Studies 41, 685-697. 
 
Gawer, A. (ed.) (2009), Platforms, Markets and Innovation, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar,.  
 
Gawer, A. and Cusumano, M.A. (2002), Platform Leadership: How Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco 
Drive Industry Innovation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.  
 
Gertler, M. S. (1995), “Being there”: proximity, organization, and culture in the development and 
adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies, Economic Geography 71 (1), 1-26. 
 
Geuna, A. (1999), The Economics of Knowledge Production: Funding and the Structure of 
University Research, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Gilson, R. J., Sabel, C. F. and Scott, R. E. (2009), Contracting for innovation: Vertical 
disintegration and interfirm collaboration, Columbia Law Review 109 (3), 431-502. 
 
Giuliani, E. (2007), The selective nature of knowledge networks in clusters: Evidence from the 
wine industry, Journal of Economic Geography 7, 139-168. 
 22	  
 
Glaeser, E. L. and Scheinkman, J. (2000), Non-market interactions, NBER Working Paper No. 
8053.  
 
Glaeser, E. L., Kallal, H., Scheinkman, J. and Shleifer, A. (1992), Growth in cities, Journal of 
Political Economy 100, 1126-1152.  
 
Graf, H. (2011), Gatekeepers in regional networks of innovators, Cambridge Journal of Economics 
35(1), 173-198.  
 
Granovetter, M. S. (1973), The strength of weak ties, American Journal of Sociology 78 (6),  1360-
1380.   
 
Griffith, R., Redding, S. and Van Reenen, J. (2003), R&D and absorptive capacity: Theory and 
empirical evidence, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105, 99-118.  
 
Griliches, Z. (1979), Issues in assessing the contribution of research and development to 
productivity growth, Bell Journal of Economics 10, 92-116. 
 
Griliches, Z. (1992), The search for R&D spillovers, Scandinavian Journal of Economics 94, 29-47. 
 
Guilhon, B. (ed.) (2001), Technology and Markets for Knowledge: Knowledge Creation, Diffusion 
and Exchange within a Growing Economy, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Hagedoorn, J. and Hesen, G. (2007), Contract law and the governance of inter-firm technology 
partnerships. An analysis of different modes of partnering and their contractual implications. 
Journal of Management Studies 44 (3), 342-366.  
 
Hayek, F. A. (1945), The use of knowledge in society, American Economic Review 35 (4), 519-530. 
 
Helper, S., MacDuffie, J. P. and Sabel, C. (2000), Pragmatic collaborations: advancing knowledge 
while controlling opportunism, Industrial and Corporate Change 9 (3), 443-488. 
 
Jacobides M. G. (2006), The architecture and design of organizational capabilities, Industrial and 
Corporate Change 15 (1), 151-171. 
 
Jacobs, J. (1969), The Economy of Cities, London, Jonathan Cape. 
Jaffe, A.B. (1986), Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D: Evidence from firms’ patents 
profits and market value, American Economic Review 76, 984-1001. 
 
Jaffe, A. B. and Trajtenberg, M. (1999), International knowledge flows: evidence from patent 
citations, Economics of Innovation and New Technology 8, 105-136. 
 
Jaffe, A. B., Trajtenberg, M. and Henderson, R. (1993), Geographic localization and knowledge 
spillovers as evidenced by patent citations, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 577-98. 
 
Kogut, B. (2000), The network as knowledge: generative rules and the emergence of structure, 
Strategic Management Journal 21 (3), 405-425. 
 
Kogut, B. and Zander, U. (1992), Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the 
replication of technology, Organization Science 3 (3), 383-397. 
 23	  
 
Lane, D. A. and Maxfield, R. (1997) Strategy under complexity: fostering generative relationships, 
in Arthur, B., Durlauf, S. and Lane, D. (eds.), Economy as an Evolving Complex System II, Reader, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley.  
 
Langlois, R. (1992), Transaction-cost Economics in Real Time, Industrial and Corporate Change 
1(1), 99-127. 
 
Langlois, R. N. (2003), The vanishing hand: The changing dynamics of industrial capitalism, 
Industrial and Corporate Change 12 (2), 351-385. 
 
Langlois, R. N. (2004) Chandler in a larger frame: markets, transaction costs, and organizational 
form in history, Enterprise & Society 5 (3), 355-375. 
 
Loasby, B. J. (1999), Knowledge, Institutions and Evolution in Economics, London: Routledge. 
 
Loasby, B. J. (2002), The division and coordination of knowledge, in Dow, S. and Hillard, J. (eds.), 
Post Keynesian Econometrics, Microeconomics and the Theory of the Firm, vol. 1, Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar.  
 
Love, J. H. and Roper, S. (2009), Organizing the innovation process: complementarities in 
innovation networking, Industry and Innovation 16, 273-290. 
 
Malerba, F. (ed) (2002), Sectoral Systems of Innovation, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Malmberg, A. and Maskell, P. (2006), Localized learning revisited, Growth and Change 37 (1), 1-
18. 
 
Mansfield, E., Schwartz, M., and Wagner, S. (1981), Imitation costs and patents: An empirical 
study, Economic Journal 91, 907-918. 
 
Nelson, R. R. and Winter, S. J. (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.   
 
Nooteboom, B., Van Haverbeke, W.P.M., Duijsters, G.M., Gilsing, V.A. and Oord A. V.d. (2007), 
Optimal cognitive distance and absorptive capacity, Research Policy 36, 1016-1034. 
 
Ozman, M. (2009), Inter-firm networks and innovation: a survey of literature, Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology 18 (1), 39-67. 
 
Patrucco, P. P. (2005), The emergence of technology systems: Knowledge production and 
distribution in the case of the Emilian plastics districts, Cambridge Journal of Economics 29: 37-56. 
 
Patrucco, P. P. (2008), The economics of collective knowledge and technological communication, 
Journal of Technology Transfer 33 (6), 579-599. 
 
Patrucco, P. P. (2009), Collective knowledge production costs and the dynamics of technological 
systems, Economics of Innovation and New Technology 18 (3), 1-16. 
 
 24	  
Patrucco, P.P. (2012), Innovation platforms and the knowledge-intensive firm, in M. Dietrich, J. 
Krafft (eds.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
 
Pavitt, K. (1998), Technologies, products and organization in the innovating firm: What Adam 
Smith tells us and Joseph Schumpeter doesn't, Industrial and Corporate Change 7 (3), 433-452 
 
Penrose, E. T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, London: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Polanyi, M. (1958), Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul.  
 
Polanyi, M. (1966), The Tacit Dimension, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
Porter, M. (1990), The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York: Macmillan.  
 
Powell, W. (1990), Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization, Research in 
Organizational Behaviour 12, 295-336. 
 
Powell, W. W., Kogut, K. W., Bowie, J. I. and Smith-Doerr, L. (2002), The spatial clustering of 
science and capital: accounting for biotech firm-venture capital relationships, Regional Studies 36 
(3), 291-305. 
 
Prencipe, A., Davies, A. and Hobday, M. (eds.) (2003), The Business of System Integration, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Reagans, R. and McEvily, B. (2003), Network structure and knowledge transfer: the effects of 
cohesion and range, Administrative Science Quarterly 48 (2), 240-267. 
 
Richardson, G. B. (1972), The organisation of industry, Economic Journal 82 (327), 883-896. 
 
Romer, P. M. (1986), Increasing returns and long-run growth, Journal of Political Economy 94, 
1002-1034. 
 
Romer, P. M. (1990), Endogenous technological change, Journal of Political Economy 98, S71-
S102. 
 
Roper, S., Du, J. and Love, J.H. (2008), Modelling the innovation value chain, Research Policy 37, 
961-977. 
 
Rowley, T., Beherens, D. and Krackhardt (2000), Redundant governance structures: an analysis of 
structural and relational embeddedness in the steel and semiconductor industries, Strategic 
Management Journal 21 (3), 368-386.  
 
Sanchez, R. and Mahoney, T. T. (1996), Modularity flexibility, and knowledge management in 
product and organization design, Strategic Management Journal 17, 63-76.  
 
Simon, H. A. (1962) The architecture of complexity, Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 106, 467-482. 
 
Simon, H. A. (1981), The Sciences of the Artificial, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
 25	  
Simon, H. A. (2002), Near decomposability and the speed of evolution, Industrial and Corporate 
Change 11 (3), 587-599.  
 
Smith-Doerr, L. and Powell, W. (2005), Networks and economic life, in N. J. Smelser and R. 
Swedberg (eds.), The Handbook of Economic Sociology, Princeton: Princeton University Press (2nd 
Edition). 
 
Stacey, R. D. (1995), The science of complexity: An alternative perspective for strategic change 
processes, Strategic Management Journal 16 (6), 477-495 
 
Sturgeon, T. J. (2002), Modular production networks: a new American model of industrial 
organization, Industrial and Corporate Change 11 (3), 451-496. 
 
Thompson, P. and Fox Kean, M. (2005), Patent citations and the geography of knowledge 
spillovers: A reassessment, American Economic Review 95 (1), 450-460. 
 
Timmermans, B. and Boschma, R. (2014), The effect of intra- and inter-regional labour mobility on 
plant performance in Denmark: the significance of related labour inflows, Journal of Economic 
Geography 14 (2), 289-311. 
 
Uzzi, B. (1997), Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of 
embeddedness, Administratively Science Quarterly 42 (1), 35-67.  
 
Weitzman, M. L. (1996), Hybridizing growth theory, American Economic Review 86 (2), 207-212.  
 
Weitzman, M. L. (1998), Recombinant growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics 113, 2, 331-360. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New 
York: The Free Press. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: The Free Press. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1996), The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Zahra, S. A. and George, G. (2002), Absorptive capacity: A review, re-conceptualization, and 
extension, Academy of Management Review 27, 185-203. 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
